The following is a discussion of the impact of new systems of work organization -- specifically, the Toyota Production System or "lean production" -- on workers’ health. The discussants are Dr. Paul Adler, Dept. of Management and Organization, University of Southern California and Dr. Paul Landsbergis, Hypertension Center, Cornell University Medical College. Dr. Adler has published studies of the NUMMI auto assembly plant, a GM-Toyota joint venture in Fremont, CA. Dr. Landsbergis has published studies of work stress and health outcomes. (See list of references at the end of the discussion.) You are invited and encouraged to respond to this dialogue. To add your thoughts and comments:
THE ISSUES
LANDSBERGIS:
Paul, I have been reading your paper on ergonomics at NUMMI and find myself disagreeing strongly with one of your central contentions. Let me see if I understand you right, and then explain why I disagree. As I read your argument, you are saying that workers at NUMMI suffered ergonomic problems not because the Toyota production system of work design was so regimented (very standardized work cycles of 60 seconds), but because this system wasn't implemented quite right.
The problem with your interpretation is that it flies in the face of so much research on control and health. Karasek's model has been strongly supported in its key argument that high demands and low control lead to illness outcomes. High demands are fine but only when they are associated with high control (i.e. authority + skills): then we find active learning, motivation, increased self-efficacy -- in a nutshell: active professional jobs. We all can accept job demands if we are rewarded by the opportunity to develop our skills and exercise our decision-making authority and abilities. (See for example my analysis in the Scandinavian Journal of Work, Environment and Health 1994; 20:349-63.)
ADLER:
You summarize very accurately my own views, but the paper itself is more cautious. Let me explain. In my own view, lean production-type work organization, based on detailed standardization and short work cycles, is a double-edged sword: it can considerably degrade ergonomic outcomes if it’s implemented poorly and without sufficient safeguards for workers' health; but if it’s implemented correctly it can improve ergonomic outcomes — at least, compared to the more traditional approach of the Big Three, where the work was characterized by short work cycles but lots of worker autonomy in how they performed their tasks (no one cared, as long as the work got done!).
I say that the paper is more cautious, because there was a lot of debate amongst the three authors, with Barbara taking a view closer to yours. The point on which the three of us could agree was that in the NUMMI case, the proximate cause of the ergonomics problems was poor implementation. It’s perhaps too early to tell if good implementation can lead to decent ergonomic outcomes.
The reason for my own optimistic view is simple. Reading Karasek, I find that the generalization linking control and illness outcomes works fine on average, but there is a large proportion of variance unexplained by Karasek's model. Specifically, from the data I have seen in Karasek (but I may be ignorant of other relevant research) there are some Tayloristic (i.e. highly regimented, low control) job environments that lead to health problems, but others don't. I think that this difference is probably due in considerable measure to the difference between what I call "despotic Taylorism" and "democratic Taylorism."
Yes, on average, health outcomes are better in less Tayloristic environments, and in my view that would be sufficient argument in favor of job designs allowing workers more control IF it were true that such work designs allowed approximately equivalent (or better) efficiency outcomes. But some kinds of production -- in particular, the mass production of standardized products like cars -- operate far more efficiently (in simple, technical-economic terms) under Tayloristic designs. So then the question becomes: can the low-control, Tayloristic job designs we see at NUMMI and other lean production plants be compatible with reasonable health standards? I interpret Karasek's data as allowing us to answer this question with a "Maybe."
That's why "good implementation" of the lean model is important.
LANDSBERGIS:
I have to take issue with several points you raised. First, the traditional approach of the Big Three did not provide for "lots of worker autonomy". Taylorism, devalued workers' knowledge. However, workers were successful in keeping some knowledge of the production process to themselves, thus enabling them to carve out additional seconds out of every minute for rest (or socializing). It's still a very limited form of autonomy compared to other jobs. And it is precisely the type of autonomy (those extra seconds) which "lean production" is designed to remove. Second, there is always variance that is unexplained by any theoretical model, such as Karasek's. Individual people (or work sites) differ. The issue is what type of low control (Tayloristic) environment might not promote worker injuries and illnesses? You argue that if lean production is implemented well, it is not necessarily unhealthy. Can you be more specific?
OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND WORKER "VOICE" -- U.S. AND EUROPE
ADLER
What would good implementation -- democratic Taylorism -- look like? The first thing is that workers would have to feel that efficiency of production is a salient l -- rather than just the bosses' goal. And second, workers must have "voice" -- a say -- both in the details of work design and in the broader process of plant governance.
LANDSBERGIS:
I would argue that workers' belief in the importance of efficiency can be (and often has been) manipulated. More importantly, workers only have a real say when they have an active union fighting for their interests in a plant with lean production and modifying the lean system to make it less unhealthy. Surely the problem is that we rarely have such conditions of "worker voice." In most cases "giving workers a real say in job design" would lead away from Taylorism -- when people have some choice they will always push for more humane working conditions. And not just in the very micro dimensions that you talk about: consider all the other variables besides standardized short cycles which we (or they) could discuss. For example, think of line speed at NUMMI. Suppose workers accepted the whole work organization there as it is, but line speed was reduced by 20% --thereby greatly reducing the injury rate. A decent compromise, don't you think? Taylorism and somewhat better occupational health!
Or consider the major improvements made by unionized workers at Mazda (now Auto Alliance, Flat Rock, Michigan) or at CAMI (GM-Suzuki joint venture in Ingersoll, Ontario), following strikes or strike threats:
*Improved staffing through a Temporary Assignment Pool of workers
to fill in for absent or injured workers. (This undermines one
purpose of teams: peer pressure to discourage absenteeism, or
to encourage working while injured.)
*Fairer access to training
*Increased transfers between departments
*Joint committees on health and safety, ergonomics, training
*The right to elect or recall team leaders
*Team leaders' duties in contract
*Increasing work loads due to absenteeism is forbidden
*Temporary assignments offered to workers on the basis of seniority
*Some limits on line speeds and job standards
*Ergonomics programs
*No reprisals for reporting injuries
Or, look at Scandinavia and Germany, where workers have even greater voice -- the job designs that workers endorse in those countries are not the regimentation of lean production.
ADLER:
Many of the improvements made at Flat Rock and CAMI strike me as wonderful. And NUMMI has already implemented quite a few (notably, a full-time ergonomics rep and a joint ergonomics committee). Others seem to me less straightforward. (In particular, I am not sure that Team Leaders should be thought of as team spokespersons, subject to election and recall. At NUMMI, Team Leaders are considered more like "lead hands" -- a position with primarily technical requirements -- and they are jointly selected by union and management based on work performance and performance in preparatory classes. Why should Team Leaders function as workers’ reps when union coordinators -- shop stewards -- are there to play that role?)
But you are trying to shift the discussion away from the micro issues of work organization -- I want to try to keep the focus here, since I think our ideas on these issues play a big role in shaping our assessment of work systems. On this score, I fear that the unions in these European countries have led workers into an impasse, since in their rejection of more regimented job designs, they are unnecessarily holding industry back from urgently needed productivity and quality improvements -- improvements that could be had without jeopardizing workers' health.
The disagreement between us is that I think that "giving workers a real say in job design" does not necessarily lead away from highly standardized, short cycle jobs, whereas you seem to think it does.
LANDSBERGIS:
I don’t think you can analyze the micro aspects of job design in isolation. In Scandinavia and Germany industrial workers accept some regimentation, but it’s counterbalanced by a great deal of influence over working conditions and line speed, and real apprenticeship programs for skill development. Compare this to the very limited skills training in the U.S.
More generally, the whole context is different: a major element of "voice" is union representation. Such representation, as you pointed out, was weak at NUMMI until stress and injuries led to a more militant union leadership. An additional response -- before they were elected, Team Leaders at Mazda were clearly impediments to "participatory management", by "playing favorites" in providing access to training or job rotation (see Babson, 1993).
ADLER:
Yes. I agree that unions in the US in general and at NUMMI in particular have rarely had the power they need to give workers effective voice.
THREAT OF JOB LOSS
LANDSBERGIS:
I would take my argument a step further: commitment and "voice" comes from having a choice and control -- otherwise it is coercion or "brainwashing". When there are no other well-paying jobs in the area available to people without college education, people will put up with a great deal of stress and regimentation to support their families -- but that’s hardly "commitment" or true "voice"!
ADLER:
To my mind, this is a complex issue. It is true that workers often accept lousy conditions only because they fear for their jobs; but what would these issues look like in some ideal kind of society? Imagine such an ideal society, one without coercion: but allow me to set one parameter so we can stay in the domain of the "even remotely conceivable" -- it is a society that has not yet reached a level of technological and/or spiritual sophistication at which people wouldn't need to work to satisfy their material needs. I would argue that the community in such an ideal society would still demand that workers work as efficiently as is compatible with their health and dignity.
This may sound far-fetched, but I don't think this little "thought experiment" is far from workers' minds when they try to make sense of the pressures they come under in industry today. Yes, when workers hear the message "Work harder, or you're out of job", many recognize the threat of job loss as a power play by capital against labor; but my impression is that many workers also see this threat of job loss as a side-effect of forces whose logic and legitimacy they accept, namely the development of an increasingly integrated world economy (see my 1993 Research in Organizational Behavior article for some quotes that are pretty eloquent). In this second perspective, some activities that have been conducted in the US can only be made more competitive (i.e. economically viable) by working harder and smarter, but not necessarily in an unhealthy way.
LANDSBERGIS:
If the threat of job loss was due to our "inefficiency" we certainly would be in a much better position today than we are -- since we have the most productive economy in the world! While workers may see the logic of the global economy, most don’t see it as all that legitimate -- they know it’s based on multinationals securing increasingly cheaper and non-unionized sources of labor. For this reason, a majority don’t accept the legitimacy of NAFTA. They are quite aware of industries that leave the U.S. for sweatshop conditions overseas where workers might be earning $1 or $2 a day. Even in the auto industry, there are many locations producing cars with labor costs lower than the Japanese. How far do we want to reduce our standard of living? Your conceivable utopia doesn’t provide a very useful point of reference because if it did really have the power you see it having, it would surely distribute the gains of higher productivity far more equitably than we see happening today. As you know, industrial productivity has risen about 15% over the past 10 years in the U.S. while real wages have fallen. So the real choice faced by workers today is not "Help restore American prosperity or we all suffer" but "Help increase multinationals’ profits, and suffer anyway".
ADLER:
You take us into a complex set of questions, and they are all important. But I am not sure that they change anything to my analysis. In some cases, jobs can be retained in the US by working harder and smarter and without impairing workers' health. In other cases, keeping jobs in the US would require high protective tariff barriers: in some of these cases, a short reprieve to allow an industry to modernize may make a lot of sense; but other cases may be genuinely hopeless, and workers would be better off mobilizing to demand that government provide retraining and new employment opportunities in activities that justify the high education and infrastructure levels of the US. In all these cases, it is obvious that many firms will use the opportunity to put the squeeze on workers....
LANDSBERGIS:
The UAW has demanded retraining and new job opportunities (and won it to some extent in contracts). But what about non-union workers or workers in weaker unions? Is there legislation pending to this effect? Hardly! A larger effort obviously needs to be to organize workers throughout the world to raise their standards of living and improve their working conditions, or we will continue to simply compete with each other for lower wages and more stressful working conditions. But this solution is in the future. So we are back to my earlier question: How realistic is your approach given the current political climate?
COMPETITIVE PRESSURE AND LEVELS OF CONTROL
ADLER:
You seem to assume that competitive pressure is always and only a pretext for bosses to increase their "take" at workers' expense. I think that this is sometimes true, but other times, the performance pressure is seen by workers as more legitimate; and in some of these latter cases, "win-win" solutions can be found. More fundamentally, I think that if workers aspire to become a "leading force" in our society (i.e. not just another special interest, but the dominant factor shaping policy), it will be by showing that they are more capable of representing society's general interests than the corporations and their lobbyists and their representatives. If indeed, competitive pressure is always just a pretext, it would make sense to adopt the "militant" view you advance; but if I am right, then a different kind of strategy is required, one where workers' organizations take the lead in proposing restructuring programs that protect workers at the same time as they advance society's general interests.
LANDSBERGIS:
I would argue that unions can do a better job of educating their members on how the "competitive pressure" argument is manipulated to degrade wages and working conditions. It's even used within the U.S.: Which U.S. plant will work faster and for lower wages to get a parts contract or an assembly plant? Such whipsawing has little to do with real efficiency -- it’s just the result of limited worker power, influence, voice.
ADLER:
But you haven't responded to my question: do you really think workers are just dupes if they accept some responsibility for reducing costs? I hear workers saying "Why should American consumers have to pay an extra $2000 a vehicle just because we can't learn to work effectively in the plant?" I don't think that they say this just because they have been brainwashed.
LANDSBERGIS:
And some workers at NUMMI and Mazda and Subaru considered their co-workers who had been injured on the job to be "slackers" -- and pressured them to not report injuries or to return to work too quickly after injury: "People should work in pain." This is one of the most dangerous aspects of the Japanese production system. Peer pressure is powerful. I won't quibble over words like "brainwashing". From what I’ve seen, lean production always seems to involve efforts to promote peer pressure to either pressure people to work while they are injured, or blame other workers for other management failures.
ADLER:
Let’s talk about peer pressure. You seem to assume that peer pressure is basically internalized oppression. I think that sometimes it is, and sometimes it's not. When managers do succeed in manipulating workers, peer pressure can indeed be nasty stuff. But when workers have real voice in how things are done, one of the consequences is that they are going to accept responsibility for their work outcomes, and that means that they will hold both themselves and their work colleagues accountable. That's a big change from the "good old days" where the only pressure to perform came from the boss, and where the working-class hero was the worker who could get away with the least work effort. When workers find themselves in this new situation and start taking more responsibility for production, it can take a while to find a new balance between the individual and the group, and new forms of respect for each other. Peer pressure can get out of hand until they find that new balance. But that doesn't mean that peer pressure is always internalized self-exploitation.
LANDSBERGIS:
As you know, the "good old days" came about because of Taylorism, a system in which workers had little power. Once workers were trapped in that system, resistance took the form of solidarity and being as creative as possible to provide spaces for play and rest. Under the "new doctrine" of lean production, peer pressure is not some aberration, but a clearly designed explicit function of the team system. Your subtle psychological analysis of finding a new balance misses the real problem: the lack of decent alternatives makes peer pressure far more dangerous because it promotes "macho" attitudes about injuries among workers -- no one wants to accept that the "good deal" you've somehow gotten is really unhealthy for you.
ADLER:
Agreed.
SOCIAL COSTS OF LEAN PRODUCTION
LANDSBERGIS:
You have raised some fascinating and important questions about the necessity of repetitive work even in a "conceivable ideal" society. Unfortunately, these are questions that require us to go beyond our own fields into broader issues of philosophy, economics and history -- industrial relations and epidemiology are very limited in their ability to provide answers to such questions! In the meantime though, we need to ask simpler questions such as: Are lean methods of production truly more efficient if the costs of such production, currently borne by society, are taken into account? These costs, of course, include occupational injuries and illnesses, including chronic illnesses such as hypertension and heart disease. In addition, there are the social costs to families of absent parents due to forced overtime.
ADLER:
I agree completely with this framing of the question. And I don't doubt that lean production implemented under autocratic management and without regulatory safeguards will indeed generate large negative externalities that need to be forcefully addressed. But I think the democratic, participative version of lean production can be socially as well as economically beneficial compared to the other economically viable alternatives.
LANDSBERGIS:
And another question of this kind: Your article says that ergonomics outcomes in Japanese auto plants are improved because older workers are usually moved off the line. But if only young healthy workers can do such stressful jobs, what do the rest of us do? What happens to the older, the injured, the weaker? They are certainly not treated very well in Japan.
ADLER:
I agree that a decent society would create productive work opportunities for the whole range of people. And in general I am troubled by work, even well-paid work, that so wears down the body that it can't be sustained over a whole lifetime without severe risk. On the other hand though, there are quite a few occupations that are not considered permanent or "for everyone" -- and not only because they are physically debilitating. Take flight attendants for example. In their case, it is not physical wear and tear so much as the toll on non-work life... which varies with age, family status, and lifestyle.
But to return to our main concern: I am not sure that we should condemn a priori any job design that is so demanding that it can't be sustained for more than a few years. Economists use the notion of "compensating differentials" to express the idea that some jobs pay more than others because they are dangerous. I'm not sure this concept actually explains much wage variation, and I'm even less comfortable with the idea that we should be willing to let higher wages compensate for truly dangerous conditions -- as distinct from simply undesirable job conditions. On the other hand, I think that it's not uncommon or unreasonable that career paths lead workers away from very grueling jobs after a while.
I would fault NUMMI for not having a career-path policy that ensures this. However, we need to note some mitigating circumstances. First, the first and largest cohort of NUMMI workers were already relatively old when they were hired by NUMMI -- the UAW forced NUMMI to give hiring priority to laid-off GM-Fremont workers. Moreover, even without a formal policy, most of the GM-Fremont veterans at NUMMI have in fact left the most demanding jobs (the jobs on the assembly line) to become Team Leaders, to retire, or to take jobs off the line.
LANDSBERGIS:
Several thoughts: First, flight attendants are working many more years now. Many are breadwinners. Second, I agree, we need to have many more jobs in the U.S. that have career paths, that allow workers to more up out of the dirty "high strain" jobs, that allow workers to develop skills. If that is occurring for the GM-Fremont veterans, that's great. Unfortunately, the trend throughout the U.S. economy, as you know, is otherwise -- longer work hours, involuntary overtime, more job insecurity, more outsourcing, fewer career paths, more sweatshops, agile companies and virtual jobs. Many elements of lean production are being applied to many different types of jobs. Where do people go when there are so few "off-line" jobs left? Japan hardly offers a healthy alternative. Its low pensions force many retirees to work in low-paid, high-insecurity supplier shops. How many off-line well-paid jobs are there in U.S. auto supplier firms -- which far outnumber auto assembly in numbers of employees and where workers have little "voice" because they are mainly non-union?
WHO BENEFITS FROM LEAN PRODUCTION?
LANDSBERGIS:
My main concern with your argument is the way it seems to hide the essential question: who benefits from these trends in methods of production?
ADLER:
You seem to think this is a purely rhetorical question, that the answer is obvious. I disagree with the "militant" view according to which only the bosses gain from these new methods. It just doesn't ring true for the situation at NUMMI anyway. There is not a soul there who wouldn't prefer working at NUMMI to working at GM-Fremont -- and I think that is a pretty decisive test.
LANDSBERGIS:
GM-Fremont vs NUMMI -- that's a choice between lousy jobs and jobs that are somewhat less lousy. That's not a fair choice. No one I know defended traditional working life under GM. The UAW under Walter Reuther tried for years to have a say about how cars were made, but were defeated in those attempts. We should be debating GM-Fremont vs NUMMI vs Saturn vs Volvo, if we want to see what kinds of methods workers would gain from.
ADLER:
OK. Then take a look at my two Sloan Management Review pieces with Bob Cole (Fall 1993 and Winter 1994) where we address explicitly the comparison between NUMMI and Volvo's Uddevalla plant. We argue there that working conditions were certainly preferable at Uddevalla, but (a) working conditions under NUMMI's (more-or-less-) democratic Taylorism were in the acceptable range, and (b) Uddevalla's economic performance was simply not good enough to be viable. If I could be convinced that Uddevalla could have both its high-control job design and a reasonable level of efficiency -- even if efficiency was, say, 10% below NUMMI's -- then believe me, I would be a fervent advocate of the Uddevalla option! But all the evidence I have seen suggests that those wonderful features of Uddevalla's work design were going to keep it from ever attaining anything close to NUMMI's efficiency. So I conclude that Uddevalla represents a hopelessly utopian solution, and that democratic Taylorism is the best we can do for now when it comes to high-volume production of standardized products.
LANDSBERGIS:
First, I think it is too simplistic to say that working conditions at NUMMI were in the "acceptable range" -- they are only "acceptable" if alternative jobs are worse. Problems of repetitive strain injuries (and other injuries) at lean plants such as NUMMI, Subaru-Isuzu, Mazda, CAMI are well-documented. We do not know about RSIs at non-union plants, but it is likely that they are more prevalent. And conditions only became more "acceptable" at Mazda, CAMI -- and NUMMI -- when their unions took action to modify the lean system. They only became more "acceptable" at other auto plants when OSHA intervened in response to union efforts. (Ergonomics also seemed to be improved at Saturn since the workers and the union played a major role in the design of production. It was not inherent in the lean system.) Again, one clearly designed function of the team system is to break down traditional worker solidarity and promote identification with the company and peer pressure -- precisely those factors which make it more difficult for unions to take concerted action on improving working conditions.
ADLER:
I think you might be right that progress in working conditions at some "lean" plants has happened by moving away from lean production principles. Moreover, some people have argued that we see something similar going on in Japan now in changes that the auto companies have made in their plants as a result of labor shortages.
But a closer look at Toyota plants in Japan shows that they have made great improvements in working conditions by refining their implementation of lean production -- not abandoning its basic principles. The work is no less standardized and the work cycles are no longer. But by tweaking the way tasks are combined into jobs and by providing modest amounts of "assist technology," Toyota has managed to improve quality and efficiency outcomes at the same time as they improve the working conditions. I will be very interested to see if quality and productivity improve or degrade at Flat Rock and CAMI.
LANDSBERGIS:
I know you believe that this is an important debate, but it's just not a major issue in the U.S. politics these days -- when the real wages of working people continue to decline while productivity rises, where the top 20% is the only group with rising real incomes, and where the flexibility required of workers (longer work hours, involuntary overtime, more job insecurity) impacts negatively on their families...
ADLER:
Again, I think you raise important issues. But they don't help us assess the significance of these new forms of work organization.
LANDSBERGIS:
On the contrary: I don't see how we can discuss this assessment without putting these new forms in their real historical context. Why is the gap in earnings and wealth in the U.S. increasing since 1979, while it was decreasing from 1950-78? (A gap that is associated with poorer health status in industrialized countries) Why are unions weaker? Isn't it the growing inequality of power in American society that explains both these societal trends and trends in work organization?
ADLER:
These are all very important questions, but I don't think they are all that closely linked to the question of work organization. Where you see a broad, general shift towards greater inequality and unfreedom, I see society today moving simultaneously in contradictory directions: in some domains, things are certainly getting worse; but in others, and often "behind our backs" as it were, the trends are far more positive. Specifically, I think that when firms are put under competitive pressure, it's true that some firms take the "low road" of superexploitation, but others try to develop forms of organization that mobilize workers' intelligence and commitment. Managers in these latter firms will typically try to circumscribe the domain in which workers are "empowered" -- to limit that empowerment to helping the firm become more profitable -- but workers nevertheless often end up with better jobs: even if these jobs are highly regimented, they allow for far greater worker involvement and more influence in the organization. As I see it, managers are forced to cede power to workers in order to upgrade business performance. A nice "dialectical" twist!
ROLE OF UNIONS, GOVERNMENT, AND WORKER STRATEGIES
LANDSBERGIS:
Nice story, but somewhat abstract. I'd rather be more concrete and specific. Your paper argued that the role of unions in providing "voice" and regulating working conditions (along with OSHA) is essential in making lean production more humane. You also pointed out how a weaker union local at NUMMI failed to adequately protect workers. Stronger unions at Mazda and CAMI fought to humanize their lean systems. Thus, key issues in assessing the spread of lean production in the U.S. are: why is the rate of unionization so low? and why is the political influence of working people (for example, a very weak OSHA) so low? So, in practice, would you argue against the spread of lean production until unionization was more prevalent and government regulations stronger?
ADLER:
You seem to suggest that since workers are in an overall weak position in the US today, progressives and unions should simply oppose lean production. I disagree. The main reason is that I don't think you can see this as a purely win-lose proposition. Management loses considerable profit potential by taking the "low road" where lean production ideas are implemented as speed-up and wage-cutting and merciless downsizing. Coercive implementations of the lean production model have a far lower return-on-investment than "high road" implementations, and workers should, I think, exploit this tension for all it’s worth. So I would recommend that workers fight for the "high road" implementation of lean production -- rather than opposing lean production outright or letting management do it however they felt like for fear of "getting into bed with management". On the other hand, it's pretty obvious that if management tries to take a low road, workers will resist by any means necessary.
LANDSBERGIS:
Do you really believe that companies will give up the benefits of coercive, low-road lean production just because it's less efficient in the long run? U.S.-based multinationals seem pretty short-sighted in such matters. Isn't it fair to conclude from the history of their opposition to all kinds of ideas that would improve both social welfare and long run profitability that they are congenitally myopic? So doesn't your whole approach depend on strong government action to force firms onto what you call the high road?
ADLER:
Yes, here I agree with your analysis. Firms are basically in the profit-making business, and so they are by nature pretty myopic about social welfare. And since they function in a competitive and unpredictable market, they are by nature pretty myopic even about their own long-term interests. So yes, I think government should play a substantial role in encouraging firms to take the high road rather than the low road.
LANDSBERGIS:
But you'd have to agree that the prospects look pretty dim for any U.S. government in the foreseeable future adopting such a policy -- unless we are able to develop a European style labor party and/or reduce the influence of business on the two major parties! So in reality, lean production is most likely going to be implemented in ways that do hurt workers.
ADLER:
I share your fears. But now you're not arguing that low-control jobs are intrinsically bad for workers health. You seem to have accepted my argument that Taylorism in its democratic form would be OK from a health point of view -- but you want to argue that this is a purely speculative proposition since the prospects for democratic Taylorism are so slim.
LANDSBERGIS:
I would agree that when workers are able to exercise more influence (control) within the confines of a Tayloristic system, through militant union activity, then the system not only becomes more "democratic" but also their increased control will mean improved health outcomes. But first, given the current state of U.S. society, I can’t see this control reaching high levels. Second, if in some isolated firms workers did achieve a decent level of control, the health outcomes of "democratic" Taylorism would still be inferior to the non-Tayloristic alternatives. And third, workers in these firms would surely use their power to move away from Tayloristic job designs.
ADLER:
That expresses nicely our agreements and disagreements! We agree on your first point: I think the chances of US workers achieving a decent level of control are only modest at best. But we disagree on the other two. I think the firms with real worker voice and democratic Taylorism will have good health outcomes, and that workers in these firms will see that the combination of democratic Taylorism’s superior efficiency and decent health outcomes are the better way to go. So perhaps we might agree that one way to move our discussion forward would be some more empirical research on these hypotheses?
LANDSBERGIS:
Resolved.
REFERENCES OF RELATED ARTICLES
Adler, P.S., "The Learning Bureaucracy: New United Motors Manufacturing, Inc." in Barry M. Staw and Larry L. Cummings (eds.) Research in Organizational Behavior, vol. 15, pp. 111-194, 1993, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Adler, P.S., B. Goldoftas and D. Levine, "Ergonomics, Employee Involvement, and the Toyota Production System: A Case Study of NUMMI's 1993 Model Introduction," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, forthcoming.
Adler, P.S. and R. Cole, "Designed for learning: A tale of two auto plants," Sloan Management Review, Fall 1993, vol. 34, no. 3, pp. 85-94. (Reprinted in Ake Sandberg, ed., Enriching Production, Aldershot: Avebury, 1995, pp. 157-178.)
Adler. P.S. and R. Cole, "Rejoinder," Sloan Management Review, Winter 1994, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 45-49. (A rejoinder to a critique of our paper "Designed for Learning" by C. Berggren, published in the same issue.)
Babson S. Lean or mean: The MIT model and lean production at Mazda. Labor Studies Journal 1993;18:3-24.
Babson S (ed.) Lean Work: Empowerment and Exploitation in the Global Auto Industry. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1995.
Berggren C, Bjorkman T, Hollander E. Are they unbeatable? Report from a field trip to study transplants, the Japanese owned auto plants in North America. Stockholm: Royal Institute of Technology, 1991.
Graham L. On the Line at Subaru-Isuzu: The Japanese Model and the American Worker. Ithaca, New York: ILR Press, 1995.
Parker M, Slaughter J. Working Smart (pp. 245-249). Detroit: Labor Education and Research Project, 1994.
ADDRESSES OF WRITERS
Paul A. Landsbergis, EdD, MPH
Assistant Professor of Epidemiology
Hypertension Center
Cornell University Medical College
525 East 68 St.
New York, NY 10021
(212) 746-2166
palands@med.cornell.edu
Paul S. Adler
Associate Professor
Dept. of Management and Organization
School of Public Administration
University of Southern California
Los Angeles CA 90089-1421
(213) 740-0748
padler@usc.edu